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We truly believe that Russian-Georgian relationship in general and 
bilaterally trade in particular, which had its ups and downs over the 
last two and a half decades of independence, needs more in depth 
study and better understanding of reasons and circumstances which 
led to the long negotiations cycle and time-to-time breaking of entire 
Russia’s WTO accession process. The crisis in relations between 
Tbilisi and Moscow became quite indicative, in part, of mixed, some-
time politically motivated and conflicting approaches of the parties. 
There were plenty of speculations about Georgia’s “troublemaking” 
at the WTO talks, which was caused from the lack of information 
and understanding of background of the Georgia-Russia standoff 
and diplomatic strategies and tools practiced by the both countries. 
We believe that the current work will make its modest contribution 
into filling the gap in knowledge and better understanding of nego-
tiations process and its peculiarities as well as outcome of 11 years 
of marathon talks. We hope that the article will cause wide interest 
within the academic circle, political establishment and broader inter-
national society.
This work is based on analyses of the firsthand information, 
personal archives, talking notes and interviews gathered during two 
decades of my Foreign Service as well as available and reliable 
literature and media sources. In addition, there are some critical 
questions to which we tried to find responses; in particular: How the 
Georgian-Russian political relationship dominated the negotiations 
dynamic over a decade of the WTO accession process? What was 
Georgia’s diplomatic strategy at the accession negotiations? What 
was a role of political elites of Georgia in the decision making and 
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Introduction
influencing trade negotiations with Russia? What issues defined 
negotiations agenda during WTO accession talks? How Georgia, 
as a small and vulnerable economy confronted a global trade actor 
– Russia? How Georgia-Russia stand-off affected entire process 
of Russia’s accession negotiations? What are costs and benefits 
for each party of the Russia-Georgia agreement paving the way for 
Russia’s WTO membership?  
The Initial Stage of Negotiations (2000-2002)
As soon as Georgia became a WTO member (the 137th, 14 June, 
2000), the Georgian government applied to WTO for membership 
of the Working Party (WP) on Russia’s accession to WTO. In ear-
ly September 2000, the Georgian Mission in Geneva received a 
reply from the WTO secretariat informing Tbilisi over inclusion of 
Georgia into the list of WP member-countries. By September 2000 
already 54 countries took part in the work of the WP, although in 
bilateral talks were engaged only 43 countries, including Georgia.
Decision making
In October 2000 inter-ministerial Ad Hoc group was established 
in Tbilisi under Deputy Foreign Minister Ms. Tamar Beruchashvili 
leadership, aiming at coordination of interagency work and elab-
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oration of Georgian position on WTO accession talks with Russia 
and other CIS countries (by the beginning of 2001 Georgia was 
already engaged in accession negotiations with Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Ukraine). Besides spe-
cial communication system was built up between the Permanent 
Mission in Geneva, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National 
Security Council and the administration of the President. The Per-
manent Representative to the UN Office and Other International 
Organizations at Geneva, Ambassador Kavadze was appointed 
chief negotiator on Russia’s and other CIS countries WTO acces-
sion negotiations. The state of affairs of Georgia’s participation in 
talks with Russia was regularly reviewed and negotiations strat-
egy was updated and approved by the National Security Council 
chaired by President Shevardnadze. 
The Role of the Georgian Permanent Representation in Geneva
Diplomatic representations accredited to international organiza-
tions located in Geneva significantly vary with a number of diplo-
matic staff and technical expertise accumulated during decades 
long close collaboration with specialized international institutions. 
In this light we have to consider huge differences in institution-
al and administrative capacity of diplomatic missions of Georgia 
and Russia. The Russian permanent representation with a great 
number of diplomatic personnel (nearly a hundred of diplomats) 
working in different fields of multilateral diplomacy (internation-
al security and disarmament, trade and economic policy issues, 
cooperation in field of science and technology, health and envi-
ronment protection, human rights and humanitarian issues etc.) 
is one of the biggest diplomatic missions in Geneva which during 
WTO talks was supported by a great army of technical personnel 
commissioned from Moscow to support accession process on the 
ground. However, the Georgian mission, which was set up in July 
1997, with a few diplomats on board (5 diplomats in total), well 
learnt how to make best use of limited capacity for dealing with 
sometime very technical issues and conducting negotiations on 
specific provisions of trade or other agreements. During and af-
ter Georgia’s WTO accession the Georgian Mission gained a vast 
experience with dealing numerous WTO issues, and particularly 
studied a lot from Georgia’s and other countries accession pro-
cesses. Furthermore, since establishment of the Georgian diplo-
matic representation in Geneva, the Georgian relevant diplomats 
were attending numerous WTO accession working party meetings 
including the Russian ones, as observers, certainly. That is why 
it was not surprising that the Georgian representation was given 
a free hand from the Government for generating initiatives and 
active engagement in the negotiation process. Nearly all sugges-
tions and drafted proposals were coming out from Geneva, then 
processed by the Department of International Economic Relations 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the special WTO unit was set up 
within the department) and circulated among all concerned gov-
ernmental institutions, to ensure that the views of all relevant min-
istries are fed into negotiations, and then amended and endorsed 
drafts were sent back on the same way to the Permanent Mission 
in Geneva. 
Strategy for Negotiations
Usually small and vulnerable economies have a little leverage 
in market access negotiations and potential for gains, Georgia 
was able to obtain through this type of strategy, was very small. 
Moreover, since Georgia’s independence, the Russian-Georgian 
relations were very tense and complex, overshadowed by Rus-
sia’s support of aggressive separatism which resulted in a loss of 
control over Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
manipulation with energy resources, trade restrictions and import 
bans, unwillingness to remove military bases from the neighbour-
ing country, interference in the domestic political affairs and lastly 
Russia’s resurgent imperial ambitions for keeping Georgia within 
sphere of its interests, represented a real threat to the national 
interests of Georgia. Despite all odds, in these circumstances, Rus-
sia’s WTO accession talks were a promising playground for Geor-
gia: if Tbilisi together with other partner countries could manage to 
disclose Russia’s WTO inconsistencies, violation of undertaken in-
ternational commitments, introduction of discriminative and unjusti-
fied measures against trade partners, real outcome of economic re-
forms under the WTO conditionality requirements, Russia could be 
transformed into a more accountable to international norms and a 
reliable state and a partner-country. Furthermore, for Georgia these 
diplomatic negotiations could serve the purpose of foreign policy ob-
jectives of the country: if Tbilisi succeeded in the talks, it would be 
used as bargaining chips in future Georgia-Russia negotiations on 
a broader bilateral agenda. These considerations set up a logical 
framework for the Georgian team who was set to start negotiations. 
General Overview of the WTO Accession Process
According to the WTO practice, accession process involves two 
different sets of negotiations that usually run in parallel. The first 
set of negotiations is conducted on a multilateral basis between the 
applicant country and WTO members in an ad hoc Working Party 
(WP) meeting. Through these negotiations, the economic and trad-
ing systems as well as measures affecting trade of the applicant 
country are reviewed and an “accession protocol – working party 
report” is drafted by the WP and adopted by the General Council 
describing the acceding conditions and commitments undertaken 
by an applicant country. The other set of negotiations is usually re-
ferred to as “market access negotiations” and conducted bilaterally 
between acceding and WTO member countries who wish to nego-
tiate a tariff reduction deal, as well as elimination of non-tariff barri-
ers, and commitments in services, so as to improve access to the 
applicant’s markets. The negotiations are conducted to adjust a bal-
ance between the rights and obligations of the WTO members who 
have reduced their tariffs and eliminated barriers to trade through 
negotiations in the past and newly acceding members who have not 
done so. The concluded bilateral accords are applied to all mem-
bers under the principle of MFN treatment and it is a prerequisite for 
completion of multilateral talks and final approval of membership by 
the Ministerial Conference (Kavadze, Ukleba, & Katamadze, 2003). 
Early Discussions
On 3 November, 2000 at the WTO headquarters – the Center Wil-
liam Rappard – was held the first bilateral meeting with the Russian 
delegation. During the bilateral talks, the Russian Federation was 
represented by director of department of customs regulations of the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade Mr. Andrey Kushni-
renko (who acted as a deputy chief negotiator); during multilater-
al negotiations the Russian delegation was led by Deputy Minister 
of Economic Development and Trade Mr. Maxim Medvedkov. The 
Georgian delegation was led by Ambassador Amiran Kavadze and 
composed of Senior Counsellor of the Permanent Representation 
Mr. Valerian Katamadze. 
The first meeting was mainly devoted to the general overview 
of Georgian inquiries on Russia’s participation in the CIS customs 
union, the Eurasian Economic Union and coordination of member 
countries during their accession negotiations. The Russian delega-
tion clarified that still there is no a clear accession strategy of CIS 
Customs Union and the Eurasian Customs Union member coun-
tries: Kazakhstan and Tajikistan did not have any vision how to 
join the WTO – with coordination or separately, moreover Belarus 
is quite far away from WTO requirements and in Geneva there is 
quite enough skepticism over Minsk’s future accession aspirations. 
Another issue, which was raised by the Georgian delegation, was 
an exemptions list from the bilateral trade agreement signed on Feb-
ruary 3, 1994. We proposed to remove sugar and ethyl spirits from 
the commodity list included in the protocol of exemptions. It was 
further commented that if the Russian Federation is not in a position 
to meet this request, then Georgia will be forced to get involved in 
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bilateral market access negotiations and will formally ask to make 
significant tariff reduction in the scheduled initial tariff concessions 
submitted by Russia to the WTO. Then the Georgian delegation ad-
dressed to a number of issues such as a ban of ethyl alcohol, illicit 
trade and smuggling at the Russian-Georgian state border, Russia’s 
preferential trade with breakaway regions, etc. As it became clear 
from the outset, the Russian delegation was not ready to discuss 
thoroughly all points raised by the Georgian side. Mr. Kushnirenko 
suggested the Georgian delegation to forward a letter with detailed 
description of all issues of particular concern of Tbilisi; then the Rus-
sian delegation would endeavor to reply to all Georgian questions.  
As it was promised, in mid-November 2000 the Georgian Mis-
sion forwarded a list of questions to the Russian Mission with the 
following points: Russia’s compliance between the process of its 
accession to the WTO and its commitments undertaken within the 
framework of the CIS Customs Union, request for removing from the 
list of bilateral free trade agreement exemptions for sugar and ethyl 
spirits, disparities of provisions of the Russian law “On temporary 
ban of ethyl alcohol imports” with the article XI of the GATT (1994), 
illegal use of well-known Georgian trademarks of alcoholic beverag-
es and mineral waters by the Russian wine and nonalcoholic bev-
erages producers, violation of provisions of the bilateral agreement 
“On customs check-points” (8 October, 1993), violation of provisions 
of the CIS agreement (19 January, 1996) “On measures for conflict 
settlement in Abkhazia, Georgia”, restricting trade-economic and 
financial relations with the breakaway region, as well as regional 
trade and economic cooperation with Abkhazia.  
On 12 December 2000 the Georgian delegation took part in the 
WP meeting which was mainly devoted to the trade in services. At 
the margins of the multilateral talks we held bilateral meeting with 
the Russian delegation as well. The Georgian delegation in both 
cases raised the issue about unilateral introduction of visa regime by 
Russia, effect from 5 December 2000, at the same time maintaining 
simplified visa regime with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. No mean-
ingful reply has been received.   
In January 2001 the Georgian Mission received a formal reply 
from the Russian delegation to a forwarded list of Georgian con-
cerns. Actually it was an “evasion letter” which was written in “the 
best traditions” of the Russian bureaucracy – no clear answer, vague 
promises, no commitments to solve the problems and reluctance to 
seek mutually acceptable solutions. It was a clear manifestation of 
Russia’s “Big Brother” syndrome – dismissive attitude toward for-
mer Soviet republics and to their legitimate rights and interests. It 
became clear: the negotiations will be quite difficult and long. During 
December talks the Georgian delegation complained on lack of 
progress and unwillingness from Russian side to seek mutually 
agreeable solutions and told Mr. Kushnirenko that if this attitude is 
retained Russia’s accession process could take quite long, even 5 
more years which does not serve to anybody’s interests. The Rus-
sian delegation was unpleasantly surprised with these “unfriendly” 
revelations and reacted with sarcastic smile, which actually meant: 
“the dog barks, but the caravan goes on”. Moscow was planning to 
complete negotiations by the Cancun ministerial to be held in 2003. 
Certainly the Georgian chief negotiator made a mistake: accession 
process took even longer – 11 more years (in total 18 years) with a 
lot negotiating rounds. 
It was a great intrigue about the date for Russia’s accession 
to the WTO which was quite difficult to envision. During the World 
Economic Forum held in New York in January 2002, Director Gen-
eral of WTO Mike Moore announced that he expects Russia to join 
the organization in two years time (Cohen, 2002). Russian Minister 
of Economic Development and Trade Herman Gref admitted that 
membership in WTO was not expected for at least till mid-2003 and 
the country’s failure to join the WTO costs the Russian economy 
$4 billion annually. After the latest round of negotiations with the 
Working Party, which was viewed as relatively unsuccessful, Maxim 
Medvedkov, made a more pessimistic forecast of three years (Co-
hen, 2002). Although the Russian leadership had demonstrated a 
strong commitment to accelerating the process, for them late 2003 
was more desirable and realistic for completion of accession talks.
Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
In May 2001 the Permanent Mission of Georgia was tasked to draft 
a statement where it would be thoroughly explained the position 
of the Government of Georgia over talks with the Russian Feder-
ation. Tbilisi wanted to send a clear message to the international 
community justifying key points raised during the negotiations and 
using WP negotiations as a communication forum to expand the 
outreach to global actors. In early June 2001 the MFA statement 
was released and all Georgian diplomatic missions abroad were 
instructed to conduct consultations with foreign ministries in coun-
tries of accreditation and deliver thorough clarifications for main 
points of the statement. In our point of view, it will be easier to un-
derstand the diplomatic tactics of Georgia at the WTO negotiations 
if we go through each point of the statement which is given below. 
Georgia welcomes Russia’s accession to WTO: The Government 
of Georgia always attached great importance to the inclusion of 
the Russian Federation into the multilateral trading system and 
regularly expressed their formal support for Russia’s accession to 
WTO. 
Russia’s double approach policy towards Georgia: Since disso-
lution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been applying preferential 
trade and economic regimes to two provinces of Georgia – Abkha-
zia and South Ossetia. Despite the Georgia’s strong objections, 
the Russian authorities and federal entities were involved in trade 
with Georgia with a policy of double approaches with regard to the 
neighbouring country: on the one hand, they created certain ob-
stacles in trade and economic relations with Georgia proper, while, 
on the other hand, Moscow actively promoted commercial ties with 
the mentioned breakaway regions, which run actually counter the 
basic principles of WTO. Furthermore, it was stated that Russia 
did not fulfil the commitments it undertook by decision taken by 
the Council of Heads of State of the CIS (19 January, 1996) and 
has developed close trade and economic ties with the separatist 
regime of Abkhazia. 
Russia’s preferential trade regime with the Georgian breakaway 
regions: The Government of Georgia expressed its concern over 
the fact that the commercial companies of the Russian Federation 
have significantly intensified their commercial activities and have 
established close entrepreneurship ties with their partners in Ab-
khazia and involved in real-estate developing business. On nume- 
rous occasions the Kremlin was officially informed about Georgian 
concerns and strategy over the breakaway regions, nonetheless, 
the Russian government was promoting its entrepreneurs to be 
actively engaged in the process of privatization, which run counter 
to the above-mentioned CIS decision.
Opening and functioning of illegal border checkpoints: Crossing of 
the state border of Georgia on the river Psou by the Russian Fed-
eration citizens travelling to Abkhazia and by foreign citizens (in 
most cases not having an entry visa to Georgia) who are admitted 
by Russian authorities to visit Abkhazia with tourist and other pur-
poses, represents a violation of the Agreement between Georgia 
and the Russian Federation “On the customs border checkpoints” 
signed on October 8, 1993. Such actions also constituted a disre-
gard of Decree № 140 of the President of Georgia, in accordance 
with which the Abkhazian sector of the state border between Geor-
gia and Russia is closed for passenger and other types of interna-
tional traffic.
Introduction of a discriminative visa regime for Georgian citizens: 
On December 5, 2000 Russia introduced a visa regime for Geor-
gian citizens visiting Russia, which was viewed by the Georgian 
leadership as an unprecedented development in the centuries 
old history of friendly relations between the two peoples. None-
theless, despite the inhospitable gesture causing the inconve-
nience to Georgian visitors, Tbilisi viewed that political move as 
expression of Russia’s sovereign right. However, the Government 
of Georgia was seriously concerned about the unilateral decision 
of the Russian authorities to maintain the so-called “simplified 
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regime” of crossing of Abkhazian and South Ossetian sections of 
Russian-Georgian state border, which, in effect, represented noth-
ing else but granting a preferential border crossing regime to the 
residents of those Georgian provinces as compared to the rest of 
Georgian citizens. Besides, local residents living in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia have been allowed to move freely in Russia with-
out any legal personal identification documents. Thus, legal entities 
and physical persons resided in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region and 
particularly tourism service providers enjoyed a privileged status in 
carrying out their commercial and business activities in comparison 
with legal and physical persons representing Georgia proper. 
Introduction of a preferential border crossing regime for 
residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia:  In justifying the 
above-mentioned preferential treatment measures, applied to the 
areas being beyond the control of the central authorities of Georgia, 
Russia often referred to humanitarian policies allegedly pursued by 
the Russian authorities for the benefit of the local population, resid-
ing in the post-conflict zone, from which ethnic Georgian popula-
tion has been forcibly expelled. Such position of the Kremlin was in 
contradiction with its policy applied to its own regions. In particular, 
during crisis in Chechnya the Russian authorities repeatedly asked 
the Government of Georgia to close the humanitarian corridor from 
Chechnya which could have resulted in the imminent death of thou-
sands of refugees, seeking asylum in neighbouring Georgia. Fur-
thermore, the Ministry of Foreign Russia has been strongly advising 
Russian citizens to avoid travelling to the eastern part of Georgia, 
where refugees from Chechnya had found shelter. In the meantime 
the Russian authorities were promoting Russian tourists to visit Ab-
khazia, which has turned into a true nest of organized crime and 
lawlessness.
The “creeping annexation” of two breakaway Geor-
gian regions as part of Russia’s aggressive strategy: the 
above-mentioned actions were a clear indication of the schemes 
which go far beyond the so-called “humanitarian measures” and 
represented an attempt to ensure unlimited control and attempts for 
institutionalization of the breakaway regions. This was considered 
as a direct support to and strengthening of the separatist Abkha-
zian regime and undisguised desire to integrate these Georgian 
provinces with the Russian neighbouring regions. In this connection 
the MFA of Georgia made reference to the European Parliament’s 
resolution of January 18, 2001 stating that discriminatory actions 
of Russia posed threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of Georgia. The European Parliament, particularly, recalled the 
Russian Government “… to reconsider these plans as they would 
amount to de-facto annexation of these indisputably Georgian terri-
tories” (European Parliament, 2001).
By addressing the questions of violation of internationally rec-
ognised trade rules (and not only), which for Georgia had both 
political and economic significance, the MFA of Georgia urged the 
Russian authorities to respect undertaken bilateral and multilateral 
commitments and to meet all WTO requirements and to stop dis-
criminatory actions against the neighbouring country. At the same 
time the Foreign Ministry wished to draw attention of the interna-
tional community to Russia’s behaviour causing just enough dis-
ruption in Georgia and possibly in future, if not prevented acting 
on its worst imperial instincts, in vast near neighbourhood. The 
mentioned MFA statement became a conceptual platform of Tbili-
si for further Georgian-Russian deliberations and in many cases 
was framed in terms of WTO rules. The Georgian delegation was 
trying by all means to avoid politicising of forwarded questions and 
requests, knowing in advance that Russia would complain against 
issues raised by Georgia as WTO inconsistent.  
Bilateral talks (21 January 2002)
On 21 January 2002 yet another round of negotiations was ar-
ranged with the Russian delegation. The head of the Russian del-
egation, Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade Mr. 
Maxim Medvedkov decided to lead personally the delegation at the 
Russian-Georgian talks. It was a clear demonstration of shift in at-
titude towards talks with Georgia: Russia, decided to pay more at-
tention to the newborn “troublemaker” and at the same time to show 
to WP members and WTO secretariat “goodwill” towards Georgian 
concerns and willingness for substantive negotiations. It became 
clear from the statement of the MFA that Georgia had quite serious 
intentions “to fight till the end”, and Russia wished to make all-out 
efforts to complete negotiations with Georgia as soon as possible. 
Apart from the issues, which have on many occasions been ad-
dressed during previous meetings, the Georgian delegation raised 
additional points:
Introduction of new regulations on import of wine and 
wine products from Georgia: The Georgian delegation further 
explained that redirecting of export of final wine products (bottled) 
from Georgia’s Kazbegi-Upper Lars checkpoint to Russia by rail-
ways through the territory of Azerbaijan and allowing the export of 
Georgian wine materials only in Northern Ossetia for certain type 
vehicles (accompanied by special convoys), represented an unfair 
practice and hidden barrier to trade that impede the effective im-
plementation of the free trade agreement concluded between the 
parties.
Violation of intellectual property rights of Georgian wine 
and mineral water producers: the Georgian delegation provid-
ed with numerous facts of abuse and illegal use of Georgian well-
known trademarks and geographical indications in the Russian 
Federation, which undermined consumer loyalty and causing harm 
to the well-known Georgian brands, which were left in Russia with-
out any legal protection. 
Violation one of the basic principles of GATT - Freedom 
of Transit (article V): It was indicated that humanitarian cargos 
sent by the Swiss Government to Georgia have been detained by 
the Russian customs authorities (claiming that the humanitarian aid 
contained dual-use goods) for more than one year, not allowing the 
cargos to reach their final point of destination. 
Restriction of import of poultry products: Russia intro-
duced restrictions for poultry products originated from third-coun-
tries through the Georgian territory while allowing free access of 
Georgian poultry meet to Russian market. The Russian decision 
makers new well that Georgia at that time could not produce poul-
try products in enough quantities to export to Russia. By banning 
the mentioned and other products (distilled spirits, wine and wine 
products, oil and oil products, tobacco and tobacco products) Rus-
sia actually wanted to suppress Georgian transit potential: this ac-
tion caused cancellation of contracts and goods already in transit 
were prevented from entering Russia with long track queues at the 
Kazbegi-Upper Lars border checkpoint. Moreover, the mentioned 
trade regulations resulted in losses to importers and intermediar-
ies represented by quite a few Georgian commercial and transport 
companies.   
In his comments, Mr. Medvedkov admitted that there are still 
some shortcomings in the trade regulations and particularly in cus-
toms rules and law enforcement practices. He further clarified that 
the closing down of an excise line at the Upper-Lars customs check-
point, which has been of great concern of the Georgian govern-
ment, was caused by internal Russian policies to combat corruption 
and optimize work of customs checkpoints. He then offered to re-
direct of Georgian cargo shipment to another “full-fledged customs 
checkpoints” particularly by railway through Azerbaijan to Russia 
(Ialama-Derbent checkpoint) or maritime transport to the Novoros-
siysk or Sankt Petersburg sea ports. As regards to the CIS agree-
ment “On Measures for the Prevention and Repression of the Use 
of False Trademarks and Geographical Indications” (4 June 1999), 
Russia has already signed it and is going to ratify the agreement in 
the nearest future, which will create a legal framework for protection 
of Georgian well-known trademarks and geographical indications 
in Russia. Besides, responding to the question about interregional 
economic and trade cooperation of Russian regions (Krasnodarski 
krai/region and Kursk oblast/district) with Abkhazia, the Russian 
government requested that all regions to bring their legislation into 
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conformity with the Constitution and with federal laws, which will be 
strictly observed by the relevant Russian central authorities. In case 
of Swiss humanitarian cargo shipment which was detained by the 
Russian customs authorities for a year time, Medvedkov pointed 
out that two trains were detained in Rostov-on-Don and Derbent 
and sent back to Switzerland because “it contained dual-use items” 
and the following freight documents were not duly completed. 
The Georgian delegation commented Medvedkov’s 
clarifications: redirection of Georgian export from Upper Lars to 
other checkpoints will cause significant additional spending for 
freight owners and international carriers and actually represents 
nothing but, using WTO term, “a hidden barrier to trade”. Regard-
ing detaining and sending back the Swiss humanitarian cargo ship-
ment destined to Georgia, the head of the Georgian delegation 
expressed his grave concern over violation of the basic GATT prin-
ciple – “Freedom of Transit” and further pointed out that it was quite 
awkward and groundless blaming Swiss authorities “for ignorance 
of international transportation and humanitarian cargo shipment 
rules” when Russian authorities did not respond to the Georgian 
authorities numerous appeals for arranging the above-mentioned 
aid shipment. This type of “shortcomings” not only represent breach 
of international trade rules but also bore a systemic character and 
directed specifically against Georgia. In concluding remarks Med-
vedkov explained that he does not have enough powers to solve 
all posed questions but what he could promise to bring Georgian 
concerns to the highest political level for further consideration and 
settlement of all outstanding issues. 
January 2002 talks marked the emergence of some positive 
signs coming from Moscow and a new hope was born on the road 
of the development of cooperative attitude of the Russian delega-
tion. We thought that the ice has already been broken...
Multilateral Talks (23-24 January, 25 April, 20 June,
16 December, 2002)
On 23-24 January 2002 was held WP meeting with the agenda: 
review of bilateral negotiations, introduction of trade related legis-
lation, review of trade regime. In the beginning of 2002 already 64 
countries were engaged in the work of the WP and among them 
54 countries were conducting bilateral talks with the Russian Fed-
eration. During WP deliberations the Georgian delegation raised 
several critical issues related to uncertain dynamic of bilateral talks, 
fulfilment of commitments undertaken by bilateral and multilateral 
agreements affecting trade in goods and services, customs regula-
tions, border crossing arrangements and measures preventing out-
flow of smuggled goods from the Russian territory, the new import 
regulations and introduction of entry limitations for certain nomen-
clature of goods causing disruption of trade with neighbouring part-
ners, violation of the “freedom of transit” GATT clause, introduction 
of discriminatory arrangements in trade in services with the neigh-
bouring country, etc. US, EU, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ja-
pan, Baltic countries, Philippines raised numerous sensitive issues 
related to export-import regulations, export duties, import duties 
and taxes, tariff quotas, excise taxes, import licenses, agricultural 
policies and subsidies, price policies, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures etc. 
Very similar discussion we had in 2002 in April 24, June 20 
and December 16: WP talks showed that progress was very slow, 
sometimes it stalled in endless “ping pongs” between WTO mem-
ber countries and Russia. The Russian delegation was accusing 
not only Georgia but other countries as well (US, EU, Japan, Aus-
tralia etc.) in requesting Russia to undertake commitments in many 
issues (double approach measures, hidden barriers to trade, export 
duties etc.),  which go far beyond of the WTO scope. Head of the 
US delegation Ms. Cecilia Klein (Senior Director for WTO acces-
sions, Office of WTO and Multilateral Affairs, USTR), was forced 
quite a few times to explain that the WTO rules are set by the mem-
ber countries and the Working Party determines the terms and con-
ditions of entry into the WTO for any country, including Russia. 
I wish to recall our June 20, 2002 WP meeting when we once 
again raised the issue about Russia’s dual policy approach towards 
Georgian nationals: for mainland residents Russia introduced a 
visa regime but for breakaway regions retained a simplified bor-
der crossing arrangements. In this connection we requested in-
corporation into the WP report the following wording: “In response 
to a request from a member of the WP, the Representative of the Russian 
federation confirmed that Russia would not discriminate among nationals 
of any Member when entering the Russian Federation under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)”. During our statement we ex-
plained that the movement of natural persons is strictly regulated 
by the GATS norms. Thus, any WTO accession commitment should 
be made with respect to persons supplying a service. As far as the 
Russian delegation has demonstrated its position to fully comply 
with the basic principles of the GATS and not to apply any kind of 
disadvantaged treatment to partner country’s nationals engaged in 
supplying services under mode 3 and mode 4, regardless of their 
ethnicity or place of origin, the Georgian delegation requested to 
fix the commitment in the accession report, which was unanimous-
ly supported by the Working Party. Here we should note that the 
Georgian delegation prior to bringing concerns before the WP reg-
ularly consulted with relevant WTO departments and experts on all 
key issues; a few times the consultancy assistance was provided 
by Mr. Richard Self, senior international assistant for WTO appli-
cant countries, former attaché at the U.S. Mission to WTO, who as 
a member of USTR delegation, negotiated the accession of Geor-
gia to WTO in 1996-1999.   
It became clear that Russia since January 2002 bilateral talks 
did not seek more opportunities to meet the Georgian delegation, 
because they could offer nothing new to the “small, but proud” neigh-
bour. That is why Russia concentrated on negotiations with the glob-
al trade actors, hoping to leave Georgia at the end of the meal, in 
other words as a “sweet” dessert, which can be easily digested. 
It was a great intrigue about the date for Russia’s accession 
to the WTO which was quite difficult to envision. During the World 
Economic Forum held in New York in January 2002, Director-Gen-
eral of WTO Mr. Mike Moore announced that he expects Russia to 
join the organization in two years time. Minister Mr. Herman Gref 
admitted that membership in WTO was not expected for at least till 
mid-2003. After the latest round of negotiations with the Working 
Party, which was viewed as relatively unsuccessful, Maxim Med-
vedkov, made a more pessimistic forecast. Although the Russian 
leadership had demonstrated a strong commitment to accelerating 
the process, for them late 2003 was more desirable and realistic for 
completion of accession talks (Cohen, 2002). 
New appointment
On October 28, 2002 I received a phone call from President She-
vardnadze who told me that he is closely watching how we work 
in Geneva and expressed his satisfaction and appreciation for the 
efforts the Georgian Mission has undertaken, particularly with re-
gard to WTO deliberations. We have never been spoiled with his 
attention and we knew well his habits - when he praised anyone 
it did not bode well for him. I found a key to Shevardnadze’s call 
puzzle when in a month time I learnt that I have been appointed 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and to Geneva was sent a for-
mer Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, heavy weight Soviet 
era diplomat Mr. Alexander Chikvaidze. Shevardnadze had very 
uneasy relationship with the latter, sometimes very tense. At the 
beginning Shevardnadze was guided by the Machiavellian prin-
ciple “keep your friends close, and your enemies closer”. Later 
the relationship conflict has become unbearable for the President 
and for him it was more suitable to use the Russian proverb: “out 
of sight, out of mind/heart”. Chikvaidze was a diplomat, so called 
“generalist”: for him “devil was in the details”; moreover, econo-
my and trade had never been his favourite themes. In February 
2003 I moved to Tbilisi to assume my new duties, besides the 
President reappointed me as head of the Georgian delegation on 
WTO accession negotiations and in the meantime I retained the 
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post of permanent representative to WTO – actually I became a 
roving ambassador shuttling between Tbilisi and Geneva for all 
WTO talks.  
                                                                               
         
Bilateral and Multilateral Talks (2003-2004)
Next round of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on Russian 
accession to WTO took place on 7-10 April 2003. During the bilat-
eral talks, the Russian Federation was represented by director of 
department of customs regulations of the Ministry of Economic De-
velopment and Trade Mr. Andrey Kushnirenko; during multilateral 
negotiations the Russian delegation was led by Deputy Minister of 
Economic Development and Trade Mr. Maxim Medvedkov. 
The bilateral agenda for the Georgian delegation included the 
following points: creation more cooperative and results oriented 
environment for bilateral talks, granting to Georgia Initial Negotiat-
ing Rights, elimination of illegal customs checkpoints at the Abkha-
zian and South Ossetian sections of the Russian-Georgian state 
border and recognition of certificates of origin of goods exported 
from Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region by the Russian customs au-
thorities, Russian discriminative approaches towards Georgian 
business operators working in the field of trade in services.  
Arranging Meaningful Bilateral Talks
The Georgian delegation referred to the meeting that took place 
in March 2003 in Moscow between Russian Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Mr. Andrey Denisov and Georgian Ambassador to Russia Mr. 
Zurab Abashidze, where the Russian senior diplomat expressed 
desire that the all outstanding issues to be discussed in a bilateral 
format, preferably refocusing on conducting talks in the both cap-
itals. We clarified that Georgia always expressed its readiness to 
conduct bilateral negotiations with Russia within the established 
WTO norms and practices. Here it should be mentioned that before 
the scheduled multilateral negotiations over Russia’s accession to 
the WTO, the Georgian delegation on several occasions formal-
ly contacted the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation in 
Geneva, with an offer to arrange bilateral meetings at the margins 
of the WP deliberations. Georgia wished to exchange views over 
the outstanding issues that were raised earlier in order to discuss 
possible solutions and to avoid any complications during multilat-
eral discussions. Both the Russian Permanent Representation in 
Geneva and the delegation to WTO did not show the same degree 
of cooperation. Apparently, on the one hand, Russian delegation, 
as a primary task, wanted to complete bilateral negotiations with 
the main trade actors – US, EU, Japan, China (since 2002), In-
dia, Australia, Canada etc., and then jointly to raise pressure on 
tiny Georgia for getting a WTO membership ticket. On the other 
hand, Russia wanted to remove the “Georgian awkward factor” 
from the WP deliberations: the Georgian statements, uncomfort-
able questions asked at multilateral talks and permanent pressing 
over whole range of trade related issues often puzzled the Russian 
delegation. That is why the Russian authorities wanted to keep the 
negotiations with Georgia at bay, somehow neutralize the Geor-
gian assertive behaviour and move bilateral negotiations from Ge-
neva to Moscow or Tbilisi where they felt much more comfortable 
and where Russia could use all range of “easily convincing” tools 
being at their disposal to calm down Georgians who have gone too 
far against the “big brother”.      
Initial Negotiating Rights
Since accession to WTO Georgia, as a small country, has used 
its membership to gain Initial Negotiating Rights (INRs) from ap-
plicant countries. The INRs arrangement allows member country 
to request compensation if the applicant country after accession 
modified or abolished the INRs. The latter has to be registered 
in national concessions’ tables, and attributed to countries that 
have been previously negotiated on the matter. There are detailed 
clarifications about methods in which WTO members can modify 
or withdraw a registered concession in their national tables in arti-
cle XXVIII of the GATT 1994 (World Trade Organization, 1994). If a 
newly acceded country modified a concession or has withdrawn the 
Member possessing initial negotiating rights on the tariff line where 
the product is or was formerly classified shall be deemed to have an 
initial negotiating right in the concession in question. The mentioned 
country has to negotiate and agree with other member countries 
who negotiated those (INRs) in the past, as well as with members 
having principal supplying interest. In this context, to have a sub-
stantial interest in a commodity trade is to possess a “substantial 
share” of that trade in the markets of the country tending to offer the conces-
sion. According to WTO practice, there is no clear definition of threshold of 
“substantial share”, though in general 10% is considered substantial 
(Kavadze, Ukleba, & Katamadze, 2003). 
On 15 January 2002, official Tbilisi asked the Russian Federa-
tion to grant Georgia with INRs on the certain commodity nomen-
clature, which usually was exported from Georgia to Russia. The 
Russian Ministry for Trade and Economic Development agreed to 
grant those rights, but significantly reduced in the number of com-
modities that were originally requested by the Georgian delegation. 
On 31 December 2002, the Permanent Mission of Georgia formally 
applied to the Russian Permanent Representation with an official 
note, stating that Georgia did not agree with Russia’s decision to 
grant Georgia INRs with only limited list of commodities. 
Kushnirenko informed the Georgian delegation that he has 
carefully studied the Georgian request and pointed out that Rus-
sia automatically conferred Georgia INRs on commodities that are 
equal or above 10% of total Georgian export to Russia. However, 
Russian side did not consider it reasonable to grant similar rights 
to those products, from which Georgian import share was insignif-
icant. At the same time, the head of the Russian delegation stated 
that this kind of request from the Georgian side was incomprehen-
sible, considering that the free trade regime was operating between 
Russia and Georgia. Furthermore, Russia did not receive the same 
requests either from other WTO members - Moldova or Kyrgyzstan, 
who similarly had preferential trade regimes with Russia. Thus, as 
for Kushnirenko, the Russian side does not understand the type of 
dogged persistence the Georgian delegation has been perusing for 
getting INRs for low profile importable goods. 
In response, the Georgian delegation pointed out that Georgia, 
as a small and vulnerable economy, wishes to safeguard against 
future unpredictable decisions of the Russian Federation; it was 
mentioned that a few years ago no one could predict that Russia 
would unilaterally introduce visa regime for Georgian citizens and 
unilaterally withdraw from the CIS multilateral free trade agreement. 
Georgia considers that in current conditions, when political consid-
erations dominate over the decision making on economic and trade 
related issues, it is possible that in future Russia can break any mul-
tilateral and bilateral free trade arrangements. It was logical for the 
Georgian delegation to request INRs for those products that repre-
sent particular interest for Tbilisi, as it may be considered as one of 
economic security priorities of the country. We further explained that 
apart from traditional goods exported to Russia, Georgia also pro-
duces certain nomenclature of goods that have a significant export 
potential in future. That is why Georgia requested INRs to be grant-
ed to those commodities that were listed originally in the Georgian 
appeal. The head of Russian delegation took note of the Georgian 
request and promised to increase significantly the number of the 
listed goods. 
Illegal Customs Border Control
The Georgian delegation put forward a question concerning the de-
cisions that was taken by the Russian State Customs Committee, 
according to which the Russian Federation unilaterally opened ad-
ditional customs border checkpoints at the Abkhazian (at river Psou 
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– Gantiadi-Adler checkpoint) and the South Ossetian (Roki-Lower 
Zaramag checkpoint) sections of the Russian-Georgian state bor-
der, thus breaking the existing bilateral agreements over bilateral 
arrangements of border crossings. The Georgian Delegation noted 
that despite a number of attempts taken by the Georgian Customs 
administration, the problem still remains unresolved. Besides, it was 
particularly remarked the importance of creating the largest cus-
toms border checkpoint in the Southern Federal District of Russia 
in Lower Zaramag, with crossing capacity of 1000 tracks a day and 
establishment of a proper customs processing and clearance infra-
structure. At the same time he pointed out that at the main legal 
border checkpoint – the Upper Lars – not  only was not equipped it 
with relevant infrastructure, but also was not assigned with sanitary 
and phytosanitary control measures for proper inspection of import-
ed agricultural products.  
The Russian delegation stated that opening of the Gantiadi-Ad-
ler border checkpoint was caused by necessary to bring in military 
supplies for Russian peacekeeping forces stationed in Abkhazia. 
The Georgian delegation emphasized the existence of other legal 
ways to supply the Russian peacekeepers, besides the mentioned 
ones. It was advised to the Russian delegation to use border check-
point in Kazbegi-Upper Lars as well as Poti or Batumi maritime ports. 
Moreover, the Georgian delegation stressed that the Russian mili-
tary bases, located in Georgia, generally receive such goods without 
any difficulties by using already agreed routs. We also pointed out 
that according to the recent statements, Russia has withdrawn the 
Russian military base from Abkhazia and particularly from Gudauta 
and claims over necessity of intensive military supplies for Russian 
military units deployed in Abkhazia are far from reality (certainly it 
was misleading press release issued by the Russian Foreign Minis-
try, which was performed in the best traditions of Russian/Soviet pro-
paganda; the Kremlin has never had in mind to leave Abkhazia and 
following events have proved that) (Tskhovrebashvili, 2001), (Shaffer 
& Ziyadov, 2012, p. 207). 
The Russian delegation clarified that the Gantiadi-Adler railway 
border checkpoint is designated to pass military cargo shipments 
as well as dual-use items and equipment, while the only mutually 
agreed customs border checkpoint located on the “Georgian Military 
Highway” – Kazbegi-Upper Lars – is not assigned for passage of 
the mentioned cargo shipments. The Georgian delegation noted that 
by setting up unilaterally the customs checkpoints at the Abkhazian 
and South Ossetian sections of the state border, meant breaking 
the bilateral agreement signed on 9 October 1993 which envisaged 
putting into full operation the only checkpoint - Kazbegi-Upper Lars. 
Representatives of the Russian delegation stated that Moscow 
wants to solve the problems related to border control and asked the 
Georgian delegation to elaborate jointly some propositions over find-
ing practical solution of this issue. We welcomed Russia’s construc-
tive attitude towards this matter and offered a suggestion to conduct 
meetings between Russian and Georgian border guard/police and 
customs service authorities in order to carry out technical analy-
sis of the issue and determine practical steps for settlement of the 
problem. The Georgian and Russian political leadership could get 
involved in this process at the next stage of negotiations. 
Trade in Services
Restrictive visa regime: Regarding unilateral introduction of the dis-
criminatory visa regime towards Georgian citizens, Kushnirenko ex-
plained, that a lot of countries in the world introduced visa restrictions 
for certain groups of citizens: for example, US introduced a number 
of visa restrictions for Iraqi and Libyan citizens. The Georgian dele-
gation pointed out that Tbilisi asked Russian authorities to work out 
a common and unified visa policy towards all Georgian citizens, in 
order to prevent discrimination on grounds of regional residency in-
side the country. The above mentioned regime has a direct influence 
on Russian market and particularly on mode 3 (commercial pres-
ence - the supplier’s right to establish and maintain a commercial 
presence in the relevant Member’s territory) and mode 4 (movement 
of natural persons – which relates to foreigners supplying services 
in another country) of service supply. We further clarified that visa 
arrangements elaborated towards another country should be put 
on an equal footing for all regions and all groups of citizens and a 
WTO acceding country can be requested to undertake the terms 
of a specific commitment on the matter. In response Kushniren-
ko asked the Georgian delegation if it would be enough to solve 
the problem Russia could undertake commitments related to this 
issue before becoming a member of WTO, as Georgia has been 
asking since commencement of negotiations.
Customs Regulations and Checkpoints
On 9 April 2003, Vice-Chairman of the State Customs Commit-
tee Mr. Aleksey Kaulbars held additional bilateral meeting with the 
Georgian counterparts to discuss in details the border customs 
control issues. It is important to mention that Mr. Kaulbars was 
quite constructive and showed understanding towards concerns 
of Georgia and offered his assistance in solving existing prob-
lems. As he explained, introduction of new regulations on import 
of spirits, wines and other alcoholic beverages was a necessary 
measure to strengthen control on influx of excised goods imported 
from Georgia to Russia via customs checkpoint in Kazbegi-Upper 
Lars, and these restrictive measures were directed against alco-
hol smuggling and so-called “spirits/vodka wars” in Russia and 
particularly in North Ossetia. Though, as he pointed out, Russian 
authorities are ready to continue negotiations to achieve a mutual-
ly acceptable settlement of issues in dispute.
The Russian delegation explained that the reason behind the 
setting up and functioning of the customs check points in Abkha-
zia and South Ossetia was to supply Russian peacekeepers with 
military equipment, ammunition and dual-use goods which was 
in full conformity to Russian customs regulations and therefore 
Russian relevant institutions asked the Georgian colleagues to 
discuss bilaterally how to arrange customs service. We admitted 
that Moscow a few times applied to the Georgian government 
for elaboration of amendments to the bilateral agreement of 9 
October 1993, however the Georgian authorities could not meet 
the Russian request to achieve mutual arrangement on opening 
the above mentioned checkpoints, because the country can-
not exercise its jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
The Russian delegation expressed its readiness to collaborate 
with Georgia in order to solve existing problem. We asked to 
Mr. Kaulbars whether it would be possible to discuss, as one 
of the options, to let the representatives of Georgian customs 
officers to work together with Russian colleagues in the above 
mentioned check points: this type of joint border management 
cooperation would allow Georgian side to monitor movement of 
goods, gather more accurate information about the movement of 
goods that are passing through those check points and prevent 
illicit trade with Georgia. 
As to Mr. Kaulbars, in 2001 he met former Georgian Tax Col-
lection and Revenue Minister Mr. Mikheil Machavariani and almost 
reached an agreement on the above mentioned issues, but after 
the latter’s departure and merger of the Georgian tax/revenue ad-
ministration with the Ministry of Finance, everything has been aban-
doned and forgotten. Mr. Kaulbars offered his high offices to for 
settlement of all outstanding issues, which envisaged conducting 
another round of talks with all concerned parties and also asked for 
other additional suggestions from the Georgian side which could 
catalyze the resolution of the problems. He also promised to enlist 
support of Mr. Mikhail Vanin, the Chairmen of the Customs Com-
mittee of Russia, in the mentioned deliberations. Mr. Kaulbars, as 
a technocrat and high ranking Russian customs official, was quite 
optimistic about outcome of bilateral discussions. He believed in 
feasibility of a mutually acceptable resolution of all disputed issues, 
especially if “politics does not influence the settlement of trade relat-
ed issues”, including customs regulations. He honestly thought that 
existing disagreements can be solved painlessly if those problems 
were discussed at the highest political level. 
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The CFertificate of Origin
The Georgian delegation raised the issue about a certificate of ori-
gin of goods exported from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It was ex-
plained that that the certificate of origin in Georgia is issued by the 
Chamber of Trade and Industry or through its regional branches. 
However, Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities cannot issue 
a certificate of origin unless the constitutional order is restored in 
these regions. Besides, it was reminded that Russia must adhere 
to the CIS agreement “On Rules for Determining the Country of 
Origin of Goods” signed by Russia on 30 November 2000. Mr. Kaul-
bars admitted that some Russian customs officials abuse formal 
duties and accept false certificates of origin and stamps, or allow 
the abuse of the customs regime by unjustifiably using preferences 
and customs concessions. He asked us to give him full information 
about the national rules of origin and a list of institutions issuing 
those certificates (CT-1 certificate): this would allow Russian cus-
toms officers to impose a strict control on legalities of certificates 
issued by the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The way, how issues were discussed by Kaulbars and the Rus-
sian side was dealing with the Georgian concerns, made us think 
that neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia nor the Russian 
ruling political elites did not wish to find a solution on the above 
mentioned problems. This hypothesis was strengthened by the 
fact that the Russian Foreign Ministry did not respond to a number 
of Georgian MFA’s official requests related to the resolution of the 
mentioned issues. During the talks, the Russian customs official 
was wondering if those questions were asked at the level of Foreign 
Ministries and whether they were responded. Analysis of the infor-
mation gathered during the meetings let us believe that the Russian 
leadership did not have a political will to settle those problems, at 
least till April 2003. On the other hand, the Russian customs admin-
istration was not able to resolve disagreements unilaterally, despite 
its strong desire and a will.
During April 2003 bilateral negotiations the Russian delegation 
showed some signs of interest (at least, how it appeared to us) 
in settling of disputed issues. As it was already mentioned, during 
2001-2002 talks the Russian delegation was ignoring many points 
raised by the Georgian side arguing that the posed questions are 
beyond the scope of WTO. In early 2003 Russia understood that 
by just neglecting the Georgian concerns at a certain stage it would 
lead to the deadlock of the entire accession process. In any case, 
the Russian tactics over negotiations with Georgia was changed to-
wards seeking new ways of solving problems and actually this shift 
was considered as a positive sign. The visa issue was of particular 
concern and quite sensitive for the Georgian government: if earli-
er Russia tried to convince WTO member countries that Georgian 
problems were outside of the WTO scope, in 2003 Russia implied 
that one of the ways to solve problems would be a commitment 
undertaken by Russia to abolish the discriminative visa regime from 
the first day of its WTO membership, or in any case to put on an 
equal footing the two breakaway regains with Georgia proper. But 
on the other hand, it may be possible that Moscow was trying to win 
more time that will allow Moscow to grant Russian citizenship to the 
great majority of residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus, by 
the time when local residents became Russian citizen, there will be 
easy to apply to the common visa policy for entire Georgia, includ-
ing the mentioned two provinces. In other words, Russia was trying 
to play a zero-sum game, whether it was possible. 
Multilateral Negotiations
On 8 April 2003, informal multilateral negotiations were conducted 
by the special working groups that were designed to help Russia’s 
accession to WTO. During the negotiations, a number of questions 
related to Russian accession to WTO were discussed individually. 
The main topics on the agenda were issues related to the customs 
regulations, protection of intellectual property rights and trade in 
services. As for the Georgian delegation, it was pointed out that the 
issues related to the Georgian concerns were not reflected in the 
draft WP report. The informal meeting, firstly, urged the Russian 
delegation to answer all questions asked by the Member coun-
tries, and, secondly, the WTO secretariat - to scrutinize carefully all 
raised issues and to reflect all inquiries in the draft report.
Official multilateral negotiations took place on 10 April 2003. 
The WP discussed the results of bilateral market access negoti-
ations and strategies for future deliberations. At the same time, 
member countries gave general evaluation of the current accession 
process, during which were selected certain directions that required 
more work. Member countries underlined the fact that in 2003 all 
three WP meetings were productive, as Russian delegation provid-
ed explanations to great majority of posed questions. 
At the same time, the Member countries pointed out that it is 
very important for them that the Russian Federation ensures trans-
parency and efficient implementation of the customs regulation 
system. Besides, the Russian Federation must pay a special at-
tention to the issues related to agricultural sector, service regime, 
tariff quotas, intellectual properties rights and other related issues. 
At the same time, the Russian delegation was asked to reconsider 
seriously its position over tariff quotas. Mr. Medvedkov was remind-
ed that, if the above mentioned practice remains, Russia will be re-
quired to conduct a serious work in order to reflect necessary justifi-
cation and trade policy tools used to protect domestically-produced 
commodities from competitive imports which should be thoroughly 
reflected in the working party report. 
Medvekov briefed the WP concerning the bilateral market 
access negotiations: since the last WP meeting the Russian Fed-
eration conducted 40 rounds of market access bilateral negotia-
tions with 32 member countries. By end of the year the delegation 
planned to conclude talks with 18 WP participants. As about the 
bilateral negotiations related to market access in services, the Rus-
sian chief negotiator further explained that talks are quite slow and 
are conducted only with WTO 15 members. According to the WP 
member statements, there were serious differences on a number of 
issues between the sides. They requested the Russian delegation 
to demonstrate progress in tariff reduction commitments on signifi-
cant number of listed goods and introduce a more liberal market for 
service providers and work hard in order to bring its trade regime in 
conformity with WTO rules.  
At the WP meeting the Georgian delegation made statement 
regarding the certain outstanding questions. It was explained that 
during previous Working Party meetings the Georgian delegation 
was regularly expressing disappointment over deadlock in bilateral 
talks and Tbilisi was persistently insisting on the Russian side to 
demonstrate pragmatic approach in order to resolve existing dis-
putable issues of bilateral trade agenda. We informed the WP that 
the April 2003 bilateral market access negotiations showed some 
signs of progress. It was emphasised that Georgia always had sin-
cere desire and willingness for in-depth consideration of all existing 
problems. Since June 2000 both Russia and Georgia travelled a 
long and uneasy road: initially the delegation of the Russian Feder-
ation was rejecting the legitimacy of questions posed by the Geor-
gian delegation, at a later stage it was just reluctant to be engaged 
in the process of consideration of those significant points, finally, 
during last negotiations round the Russian Federation has demon-
strated a positive signs of goodwill for finding out the ways of mutu-
ally agreeable solution of those problems. The issues having critical 
importance for Georgia remained still outstanding and needed to 
be resolved prior to Russia’s accession to the WTO. The Georgian 
delegation expressed a hope that the appropriate action and re-
sults-oriented work will be pursued by the Russian Federation in 
order to resolve the questions raised by the Georgian delegation in 
the course of bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
Strategy for future actions: The Georgian permanent represen-
tation to Geneva was regularly sending communications to the MFA 
with suggestions how to resolve all outstanding issues on the inter-
governmental level. The priority was given to the multilateral nego-
tiations with Russia (bilateral talks were progressing slowly and still 
WP discussions could yield some meaningful results), during which 
Journal of Social Sciences; ISSN: 2233-3878; e-ISSN: 2346-8262; Volume 5, Issue 1, 2016
Georgia’s Trade Diplomacy: the Georgian-Russian Talks on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organisation – Victory or Defeat? 
49
the issues of customs regulations and illegal checkpoints could 
have been discussed. For this purpose it was advisable to arrange 
a meeting between the customs agencies of both countries. At the 
early stage, Georgian and Russian customs officials could discuss 
technical aspects of cooperation and mutual administrative assis-
tance. At a later stage a political decision could have been taken at 
the governmental level. The Russian delegation expected that the 
next round of negotiations was to become practically a breaking 
point in the Russia’s accession long process. By September 2003 
it will have become clearer whether Russia is able to complete the 
accession process before the Cancun WTO ministerial (10-14 Sep-
tember, 2003). Accordingly, it was advised that the Georgian side 
had to be well prepared for upcoming meetings and therefore all 
key issues had to be fixed in the WP report. Besides, the Georgian 
mission in Geneva was suggesting the MFA that relevant govern-
mental institutions to study and analyze carefully the draft WP re-
port, to identify critical issues and then to forward instructions to the 
Georgian delegation in order to assure that all Georgian concerns 
are properly reflected in the WP report. 
The Rose Revolution: A Short “Honeymoon” or the Calm 
Before the Storm? 
In November 2003 Georgia entered into a deep political crisis: thou-
sands of demonstrators took into the streets to protest against al-
leged vote rigging of a November 2003 parliamentary election. The 
protesters demanded the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze, a 
man who had ruled Georgia for more than 3 decades (in total). As a 
result of mass protest actions, Shevardnadze resigned bringing into 
power a coalition of three opposition leaders– Mikheil Saakashvili – 
President, Zurab Zhvania – Prime-Minister and Nino Burjanadze – 
Speaker of the Parliament. After the Rose Revolution Georgia was 
run by well educated, motivated and sometime even aggressive, 
ambitious young politicians, who were in a hurry to build a prosper-
ous and western style country.  
One of the main foreign policy priorities of the new government 
was rapprochement with Russia. On 10 February 2004, President 
Saakashvili paid his first official visit to Moscow and met President 
Putin. The young Georgian leader promised to extend his friendly 
hand to his Russian counterpart, turn a very dramatic page in our 
past and start relationship from the “clean slate”. A friendly atmo-
sphere of the meeting raised hopes in Tbilisi about possible im-
provement of the relationship between Tbilisi and Moscow. Apart 
from consideration of trade-economic, military issues, as well as 
seeking new ways for restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, 
the Kremlin and Tbilisi agreed to sign a new bilateral framework 
agreement on friendship and good neighbourly relations, President 
Putin was invited to visit Tbilisi in near future (the invitation was 
kindly accepted), and act in international arena taking into account 
mutual interests. 
In mid-February of 2004 I was summoned to the office of the 
National Security Council (NSC) of Georgia and was asked to 
present a progress report over the Georgia-Russia WTO acces-
sion talks. I briefed the newly appointed NSC secretary Mr. Vano 
Merabishvili about my vision and perspectives of multilateral and 
bilateral talks. I informed Merabishvili about some achievements 
in multilateral negotiations format, particularly noted that nearly 
all Georgian concerns have already been fixed in the WP draft 
accession report; however, as further I explained, while bilateral 
talks have been stuck because of Russia’s unwillingness to solve 
all existing problems, some promising signs have already been 
observed. He told me that the political leadership of the country 
decided to complete the bilateral negotiations with Moscow and to 
sign the market access agreement as soon as possible. I delicately 
raised the question about the price the government is going to set 
for this kind gesture and expressed the hope that the government 
will get the best bargaining deal with the Kremlin. He responded 
with a knowing smile: “Don’t worry; this matter will be in reliable and 
capable hands”. In the meantime I was instructed to relinquish all 
my duties including WTO ones and to leave Tbilisi for London – to 
the place of my new ambassadorial assignment. Soon it was pub-
licly announced that the Georgian government reached an agree-
ment over bilateral talks with Russia which will be concluded in the 
margins of the business forum to be held in Tbilisi on 28-29 May 
2004. 
On 28 May 2004 Minister of Economy of Georgia Mr. Irakli 
Rekhviashili and Minister of Economic Development and Trade of 
the Russian Federation Mr. Herman Gref concluded in Tbilisi a bi-
lateral market access agreement. Russia granted Georgia request-
ed INRs; besides the separate protocol was signed where Russia 
pledged to eliminate all inconsistencies in the field of customs reg-
ulation and administration, and to bring its trade policies and prac-
tices into conformity with WTO principles and norms. Georgia, in its 
turn, committed to complete in near future national procedures for 
entering into force of the protocol of 3 February 1994 over exemp-
tions from the bilateral free trade agreement. 
In the meantime the Kremlin wanted to build a type of vassal-
age relations with Georgia. For Moscow it meant demonstration of 
seniority in the region and subordination to the dominant country, 
showing that the boss can be “very kind and grateful” and at the 
same time punitive if it is needed (the “carrot and stick” approach). 
Here should be particularly mentioned the Russia’s significant role 
in peaceful departure from power of Adjarian secessionist warlord 
Aslan Abashidze, who showed his dictatorial habits and growing 
separatist tendencies since his rise to power in early 90s. More-
over, his power was safeguarded by the Russian military base sta-
tioned in Batumi. The tensions erupted between the leadership of 
Adjara and the new central authorities of Georgia and has almost 
reached boiling point in early May 2004. Saakashvili regime was 
even ready to use military force aiming at restoration of control 
over Adjara. As the Tbilisi-Batumi confrontation played out, Georgia 
once again was at the edge of a civil war. On 5 May, Prime Minis-
ter Zhvania went to Adjara to hold talks with Abashidze and joined 
the protest rally in the center of Batumi against the local dictator. 
Suddenly President Putin offered his help to Saakashvili and com-
missioned Russia’s Security Council Secretary Mr. Igor Ivanov to 
Georgia, who on 5 May 2004 first flew to Tbilisi and then to Batumi 
to mediate the standoff. Ivanov convinced Abashidze to step down, 
offered political asylum to him and his entourage and his private jet 
to leave Adjara immediately. On 6 May early morning Abashidze 
resigned and flew to Moscow into exile. On the same day President 
Saakashvili made a triumphant appearance in Batumi celebrating 
liberation of Black Sea region from the “medieval time feudal”. Ac-
tually it was a price the Kremlin paid off for Georgia’s “goodwill and 
cooperative attitude”, including conclusion of bilateral market ac-
cess accords with Russia. 
Flushed with success after liberation of Adjara, the Government 
of Georgia sought to bring two other breakaway regions back into 
the Tbilisi fold. Saakashvili now turned to another breakaway region 
– South Ossetia, which he considered much easier to bring under 
the constitutional order than Abkhazia and at minimal cost. He ex-
pected President Putin would support him as in Adjarian case or at 
least the Kremlin could turn his blind eye to Georgia’s attempts to 
return back the Tskhinvali region. However, on 8 July 2004 several 
dozen Georgian peacekeepers deployed in Tskhinvali conflict zone 
were disarmed by Ossetian militia forces and then were brought 
to the centre of Tskhinvali and forced to their knees in front of TV 
cameras. The Georgian leadership got furious and launched a mil-
itary operation on 8 August 2004. By August 19, Georgian troops 
captured strategic heights and started shelling regional capital 
Tskhinvali. However under the Russian heavy pressure and fierce 
resistance of Ossetian militia forces the Georgian command hand-
ed over these heights to the joint peacekeeping troops and pulled 
out from the conflict zone. Saakashvili by launching this operation 
made several mistakes: firstly, Georgia did not have any capable 
military forces to win even a “small victorious war”, secondly, the 
President was misled by Minister of Interior Mr. Irakli Okruashvili 
who assured the President that the city would be taken in 24 hours 
(later he admitted that Okruashvili was the “biggest mistake of 
his life”), thirdly, he miscalculated the Russian reaction and con-
sequences of the military conflict: the operation ended with quite 
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heavy results – 17 dead, several dozen injured of Georgian ser-
vicemen and shameful retreat to initial positions and finally spoiled 
its relations with the northern neighbour. This brief war was a turn-
ing point in Russian policy towards Georgia. After August 2004, the 
sequence of event showed that the Georgia-Russia honeymoon 
was over. Russia, considered that security of Russia’s South flank 
depends on the situation in South Caucasus, and offered undis-
guised support for the separatist regimes and started speaking with 
Tbilisi from a position of strength – using combined diplomacy, both 
hard and soft power to have Georgia more obedient to the Russian 
will. Actually for Moscow low politics became a supplement for high 
politics; the Kremlin sought restoration of Russia’s greatness and 
influence both in near neighbourhood and globally; the mentioned 
security and foreign policy priorities predetermined Putin’s politics 
and actions for the decades ahead.  
The Deadlock
From 2004 onward the centre of gravity of WTO relationship and 
trade policies had been shifted from MFA to the Ministry of Econo-
my of Georgia. Deputy minister Ms. Tamar Kovziridze was appoint-
ed chief negotiator.  
In 2004-2006 political environment for the Russian-Georgian 
WTO talks was very adverse. For Georgia it was not easy to stand 
firm to Moscow’s sabre-rattling; in the following years the Kremlin 
was able to exert considerable pressure over Georgia on all di-
rections. Particularly, the Russian government pursued policies of 
“double standards”: fighting the secessionist movement at home 
yet evidently supported separatism in Georgia. Gas delivery manip-
ulation, regular violating Georgian airspace, bombings adjacent to 
the breakaway regions, provocative actions of the Russian peace-
keepers became a daily routine for the Georgian-Russian relations. 
In February 2006 Russia stopped issuing visas for Georgian na-
tionals, in March 2006 banned import of Georgian wine and wine 
products, then distilled alcohol and brandy; later sanctions were ex-
panded to mineral waters and all agricultural products. In July 2006, 
Russia “temporarily” closed Kazbegi-Upper Lars border checkpoint 
for “construction reasons,” disrupting Georgian exports and inland 
and transportation connection with Russia. 
Nonetheless, there were some signs of cooperation in 2005-
2006. On May 30, 2005 Russia and Georgia signed a long-negoti-
ated agreement on the withdrawal of Russian military bases from 
Georgia and started pulling out its two military bases dislocated in 
Batumi and Akhalkalaki on an accelerated time-frame. According to 
the concluded accords, parties agreed to set up an antiterrorist cen-
tre in Batumi, which has never occurred despite the Russia’s many 
appeals. On top of that the spy scandal of September 2006 entire-
ly destroyed any signs of rapprochement. When Georgia arrested 
four Russian intelligence officers and ten Georgian citizens on es-
pionage charges, and later handed over to the OSCE delegation 
with a staged TV show (quite humiliating one), a tipping point was 
evidently reached. Putin’s self-esteem was deeply hurt; the Krem-
lin felt that Georgia let them down, and reacted promptly: Moscow 
recalled the ambassador and diplomatic staff from Tbilisi, the troop 
pullout was postponed, all transport and postal links between the 
two countries were suspended, Georgian-run businesses in Russia 
were harassed and thousands of Georgians were deported from 
Russia. In January 2007 “Gazprom”, Russia’s sole natural gas ex-
porter, doubled price of gas imports to Georgia. 
Certainly, crisis escalation affected Georgia’s attitude towards 
WTO talks as well. In February 2006 Georgia started its consulta-
tions with the partner countries over possibility of suspending work 
of the WP. The MFA sent out instructions to its embassies abroad 
to hold meetings in the western capitals informing the EU member 
countries and Washington regarding Tbilisi’s intentions to reopen 
bilateral talks with Russia and as a last resort to block the work 
of the Working Party. As a Georgian ambassador to the Court of 
St. James’s I had consultations with the FCO officials – Mr. Cre-
on Butler, Chief Economist, Director Economic Policy Department 
and Mr. Paul Carter, Russia and CIS Economist, Global Econo-
my Group. UK’s main concern was related to the issues of protec-
tion of intellectual property rights, enforcement of newly adopted 
legislation; the UK envisaged Russia’s accession to the WTO, in 
general, as a positive act in view of the fact that the WTO could 
put into effect its rules and principles which will create a reliable 
framework to avoid in future Russia’s any WTO inconsistent or dis-
criminatory policies against its trade partners. London was inclined 
to think that while the WTO member countries, having Russia as 
a WTO member, would have much more power to observe and 
impose control against Russia’s trade related barriers and restric-
tions; as the British diplomats suggested, the US–Russia bilateral 
discussions might have more effect than any other ongoing bilat-
eral or WP party meetings. The FCO officials assured us that they 
work closely with Brussels: the DG Trade had its concerns over 
implementation of commitments undertaken by Russia and during 
upcoming WP meetings the EU delegation intends to send clear 
messages to Russia about necessity of removal of all WTO incon-
sistent measures and practices. In the meantime the British diplo-
mats were wondering if Georgia, at the certain stage, could block 
Russia’s accession process. We reassured the FCO officials that if 
bilateral talks reached the extreme point and yielded no meaning-
ful results, Georgia can use veto right over the accession process, 
though Tbilisi will conduct consultations on the matter with US and 
EU in advance. Later in 2006-2010 I had similar talks with Swedish 
and Finnish Foreign Ministries: both Stockholm and Helsinki were 
wondering if Georgia could block Russia’s accession process and 
how long it will take to arrange bilateral relations.   
On July 14, 2006 Tbilisi renounced its bilateral market access 
agreement on Russia’s accession to the WTO. As MFA stated, 
Georgia had opted to withdraw from the May 28, 2004 agreement 
in protest against Russia’s closing of the only legal Kazbegi-Upper 
Lars checkpoint, while Russia’s checkpoints with the separatist re-
gions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained in place and in full 
operation. 
In autumn 2006, the Government of Georgia sent a letter to WTO 
Director-General Pascal Lamy wishing to suspend further meet-
ings of the WP, unless Russia lifts discriminatory sanctions against 
Georgia. The secretariat together with WP members decided to ac-
commodate Georgia’s request, however it was offered to convene 
informal consultations which will allow working on consolidated doc-
ument, just a draft for informal consideration. Since that time no sin-
gle formal WP meeting was held the WP report had to be approved 
by consensus. The last version of the draft report was circulated in 
October 2004. Georgia wanted to include into the text the wording 
that would reflect all its concerns and resisted the formal publication 
and circulation of the WP report. After rather tens discussions it was 
agreed that the secretariat would circulate the draft material as an 
informal document entitled “consolidation of draft texts”. As Icelandic 
Ambassador Stefan H. Johannesson, the chairman of the WP on 
Russia’s WTO accession, recalls: “this was a pragmatic solution and 
demonstrated that while Georgia had unresolved issues with Russia 
it was willing to be constructive and to take the concerns and inter-
ests of other members into account and allow a substantive work to 
be continued” (Johannesson, 2015, p. 597). 
In January 2007 Georgian and Russian delegations held sev-
eral bilateral meetings at the WTO HQ.  As a result of the consulta-
tions, Georgia decided to withdraw all its demands to the Russian 
Federation except one - the functioning of border and customs 
checkpoints operating in Georgian breakaway regions (BBC Mon-
itoring, 2007). The Georgian side viewed this request as Russia’s 
commitment undertaken by the bilateral agreement on Russia’s ac-
cession to the WTO signed in May 2004. The delegations decided 
to meet again in the spring of 2007 (BBC Monitoring, 2007). 
On May 31, 2007 Tamar Kovziridze and Maxim Medvedkov met 
again in Geneva; the agenda of bilateral talks included the Georgian 
concerns about checkpoints at the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
sections of the Georgia-Russian state border. Most of the debate 
was about whether the border crossing issue was WTO-related. 
When Kovziridze asked why the Russian authorities allowed the 
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border checkpoints to operate without Tbilisi consent, Medvedkov 
replied with the counter question: “Did you ask us for permission to 
open a checkpoint at the new airport in Tbilisi?” (Wikileaks: Geor-
gia, 2007). Kovziridze clarified that the airport is not located at the 
border of a foreign country, as are Gantiadi-Adler and Roki-Lower 
Zaramag checkpoints. The discussion did not reach any practical 
solution. It became clear that the Russian attitude in the negotia-
tions with Georgia was at odds with the Kremlin’s professed respect 
for Georgia’s territorial integrity, but consistent with their support for 
the legitimacy of the de facto authorities in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali. 
On April 28 2008, the Government of Georgia applied to the 
members of the WP announcing that it is temporarily suspending 
its bilateral talks with Russia until Moscow repeals the Presidential 
order issued of April 16, 2008, to “interact” with the de facto regimes 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, “including organizing cooperation 
in the trade, economic, social and techno-scientific fields”. Tbilisi 
also contended that special new rules for South Ossetia and Ab-
khazia violate WTO obligations to treat all parts of Georgian cus-
toms territory equally. The same day Russia issued a statement by 
its delegation to the WTO working party that it does not consider it 
necessary to notify the new rules to the WTO and that the MFA’s 
April 16 statement is sufficient for all purposes. It expressed its will-
ingness to continue bilateral negotiations with the Georgian delega-
tion. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Grigol Vashadze 
held meetings with US and EU Ambassadors asking support for its 
position in this matter. The WTO Secretariat has made it clear that 
Georgia is within its rights to insist on a resolution of the border 
crossing issue, and to withhold its assent to the accession process 
moving to the multilateral phase until that is accomplished. 
The US and EU were closely watching Tbilisi’s conduct during 
the Georgian-Russian talks. While EU was keeping neutrality and 
just wanted to be well informed over Georgia’s intentions at the 
negotiations, the US was quite supportive, particularly for the Geor-
gian position over the border crossing issue. As to US Ambassador 
John Tefft, the Georgia’s concern regarding the Kremlin’s 16 April, 
2008 instructions, could seriously complicate the border crossing 
issue which merits serious consideration. He further concluded in 
his cable, that “a temporary halt to the bilateral negotiations would 
seem to be reasonable and justifiable in that light” (Wikileaks: Geor-
gia, 2008).
The general deterioration in Russo-Georgian political relations 
started in spring 2008. In early August 2008 endless provocations 
from both sides around Tskhinvali district resulted in a Russian mil-
itary intervention and a full-scale war between the two countries. It 
had catastrophic consequences for Georgia; Russia launched a war 
against Georgia aiming at: preventing Georgia’s further westward 
integration, increasing Russia’s control of the Caucasus region; re-
taliation for the expulsion of Russian military bases from Georgia, 
and for Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence (Kavadze & 
Kavadze, 2015). As a result Russia occupied Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, recognized independence of the two Georgian provinces, 
built-up two military bases and conducted the borderzation of ad-
ministrative borders between Georgia proper and the mentioned 
secessionist regions. Subsequently, the war had quite a negative 
impact on the Russia’s accession to the TWO and particularly on 
Russian-Georgian talks: it had been frozen for two more years. 
Resumption of the Russian-Georgian Bilateral Talks
The “Surplace”
By the end of 2010, as it was expected, Georgia became an “inhib-
iting factor” on the final way of Russia’s WTO membership: bilateral 
negotiations have been completed with all partner countries, except 
Georgia; the WP work was put on hold because of Tbilisi’s objec-
tions to the further WTO accession deliberations. Georgia was left 
face-to-face with Russia. Nonetheless, the Government of Georgia 
acknowledged that the Russia’s accession to the WTO was a mat-
ter of significance for US, EU and other partner countries, therefore, 
Russia was expecting Washington and Brussels to put pressure on 
Georgia aiming at taking “more constructive approach” at WTO talks. 
However, Tbilisi was insisting that there was no such pressure put 
on Georgia, since friends of Georgia and partners assumed that the 
Georgian demands are justified and its legitimate political demands 
could be realized through constructive talks with Russia. The Geor-
gian leadership reportedly declared that Tbilisi will use veto right un-
less the Georgia’s concerns are thoroughly discussed and resolved. 
In 2011 Tbilisi offered the Russian Federation a new approach 
over resumption of bilateral negotiations on the latter’s accession 
to the WTO. This diplomatic gesture was reciprocal: Moscow too 
was ready to be engaged in results oriented negotiations. Besides, 
Tbilisi had been receiving delicate reminders coming from Washing-
ton and Brussels that some win-win solution should be elaborated. 
Particularly, after Obama-Putin talks: “President Obama pledged to 
support Russia’s efforts to complete remaining steps in multilateral 
negotiations so that Russia could join the WTO as soon as possible,” 
the White House emphasized in a statement after a phone conver-
sation between the Russian and US Presidents on October 1, 2010 
(Reuters.com, 2010). According to Lawrence Summers, director of 
US President National Economic Council, Moscow recognized that 
“some sort of creative solution” needs to be applied to remove Geor-
gia’s objection to Russia’s WTO membership. He said that Russia’s 
bid to join WTO may be successfully completed within a year and 
Georgia’s issue on the matter was thoroughly discussed during his 
recent talks with Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Shuvalov 
(Civil.ge, 2010). On several occasions US made it clear that while 
supporting the early conclusion of Russia’s WTO accession – but 
not at any price.
On 24 October 2010, as soon as the EU-Russia bilateral talks 
were completed, EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht comment-
ed: “We have struck a deal on the final outstanding bilateral issues, leaving the way 
open for Russia to join the WTO by the end of this year...There is now very little 
time left to reach a bilateral agreement between Georgia and Russia. I call on both 
parties to continue their efforts to find a solution in a spirit of compromise. The EU 
is ready to offer whatever help is necessary to resolve the issue” (Delegation of 
Europena Union to Russia, 2011). It was already noticeable that the 
Georgia’s “inflexible” position became an irritating factor for the EU 
Commission. Key WTO member-countries (US, EU, Canada, Japan, 
Australia, etc.) offered both Russia and Georgia to resolve disagree-
ments till mid November 2011, thus all engaged parties were waiting 
for the outcomes of the Georgia-Russia talks. 
In January 2011, the Russian government expressed its readi-
ness to resume negotiations with Georgia and nominated Mr. Maxim 
Medvedkov, as chief negotiator. Tbilisi confirmed its devotion to ne-
gotiations and readiness to meet the Russian delegation under the 
Swiss mediation and formed a delegation led by Chief Advisor to 
the Prime-Minister, Ms. Tamar Kovziridze. The Georgian team was 
strengthened by deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Sergi Kap-
anadze, who distinguished himself in the field of conflict resolution 
in Georgia. Since the countries did not have diplomatic relations the 
Swiss Foreign Office volunteered for facilitation of the dispute settle-
ment and expressed readiness to mediate bilateral trade talks.
The “KK approach”
In the meantime, the Georgian delegation elaborated a strategy, 
called the “Kovziridze-Kapanadze approach” (“KK approach”) over 
resumption of bilateral negotiations with the Russian Federation. 
The “KK approach” contained a few concrete points which were con-
sidered by Tbilisi as a basis for future deliberations. The Georgian 
government wanted to set the tone of negotiations and announced 
through all available diplomatic and public channels that the Geor-
gian delegation will raise only WTO compliant issues. Notwithstand-
ing that, Georgia expressed readiness to seek a fair, reasonable and 
mutually acceptable solution, even pledged that the issue of embar-
go, Russia has imposed on Georgian export since 2006 on political 
grounds, which was undeniably in breach with WTO principles, will 
not be included into the agenda of negotiations.
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Nonetheless, on 13 March, 2011 Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia may join WTO without Georgia’s 
support: “If our Georgian colleagues continue to keep sticking to 
their politicized position, then the issue of Russia’s accession to 
WTO will, probably, have to be resolved differently, without their 
participation. There are legal means of doing that… Georgia 
should give the go-ahead to Russia’s accession to the WTO…We 
are ready for such communication with Georgia and have already 
agreed with Swiss mediation to hold talks in Geneva only on the 
bases of the WTO related issues” (Civil.ge, 2011).
It meant that Russia was ready, in case of the Georgian veto 
on Russia’s accession, to request voting procedures to solve the 
issue. According to the WTO rules, if during decision making con-
sensus cannot be achieved the matter shall be resolved by vot-
ing and that the agreed procedure does not preclude a member 
from requesting a vote. Russia hoped that Georgia will be outvot-
ed at the General Council meeting, where the membership issues 
theoretically can be decided by the Ministerial Conference which 
approves the accession agreement by a two-thirds majority of the 
Members (Ehlermann, 2005). There were three considerations on 
this issue the Georgian delegation took into account: the member-
ship issue cannot be included into the agenda of the WTO General 
Council session unless Russia completed all bilateral negotiations, 
including with Georgia; before the issue is taken to the General 
Council, WTO member states have to adopt the accession protocol 
with the Working Party report, usually by consensus; according to 
the WTO practice, the General Council has never taken a decision 
over membership with the majority of votes: decisions on member-
ship have always been taken by consensus. 
Tbilisi believed that the effectiveness of the decision-mak-
ing process will be quite negatively affected if WTO abandons a 
consensus principle on such a key issue as accession of a new 
member. The WTO main players (US, EU, China, Japan, Canada, 
India, Brazil, Korea, etc.) usually are not in favour of such prece-
dent either, because there is a risk that they can be outvoted by 
small economies on certain trade issues and, consequently, it was 
a very low probability of Russia’s successful move on the matter 
(Kavadze, Ukleba, & Katamadze, 2003), (Ehlermann, 2005). 
The functioning of the two illegal check-points at the Geor-
gian-Russian state border again became the only topic of the nego-
tiations. For Georgia the issue of main concern was the transparent 
and WTO-compliant functioning of the checkpoints in the post-con-
flict/occupation zones, which could be done through applying var-
ious international experiences and arrangements. The Georgian 
delegation elaborated 3 options of border control which could be 
discussed with the Russian team.
• Option 1 (the best option): Deployment of Georgian customs 
officers at the mentioned check-points. The Georgian delegation 
well understood that it will be quite difficult technically to organize 
work of Georgian customs officers in the checkpoints located on 
the Russian of the state border. Besides, with great probability we 
could assume that the Abkhazian and South Ossetian de facto 
leadership would disapprove the proposal (the Russian delegation 
from the outset rejected the possibility of stationing of Georgian 
customs officers at the Russian checkpoints in Adler and Lower 
Zaramag);
• Option 2 (preferable option): Using internationally accepted 
mechanism of border control in post-conflict zones similar to the 
EU BAM (EU Border Assistance Mission in Moldova); for Georgia 
it would be preferable arrangement of a border control under moni-
toring of international organizations and, in the first instance, using 
the EU border monitoring assistance practices; 
• Option 3 (can be discussed in the last instance): Inviting an 
independent private company for border monitoring (transit moni-
toring, cargo tracking, inspection services, transmitting cargo infor-
mation etc.) under the Russian-Georgian border crossing special 
monitoring arrangement (this option was kindly suggested by the 
Swiss mediation).
In 2011 the Georgian and Russian delegations met in Bern and 
Zurich a number of times. After a few meetings, which ended with 
failure, in summer 2011 delegations took Option 3 as a basis for 
future deliberations and the work moved forward.     
Conclusion of the Agreement: Costs and Benefits
On 9 November 2011, in Geneva, under mediation of the Swiss 
diplomats, Georgia and Russia signed a package of documents: 
a bilateral agreement on the basic principles for a Mechanism of 
customs administration and monitoring of trade in goods, relevant 
Memorandum of Understanding affirming the role of Switzerland as 
the neutral third Party, then Georgia, Russia and Switzerland ex-
changed documents to define conditions and tasks for operation of 
a neutral private company, which will be accountable to the Swiss 
Government for monitoring purposes. The mentioned accords en-
visaged establishment of a mechanism of customs administration 
and monitoring of trade in goods consisting of an International 
Monitoring System (IMS) and an Electronic Data Exchange System 
(EDES). 
Tbilisi and Moscow both claimed victory. This agreement was 
considered by the Georgian government as an important achieve-
ment which enables Georgia through independent international 
observance to monitor trade between Russia and the Georgian 
breakaway regions. The Saakashvili regime, which has already 
been shaken, needed some, even small victories, particularly for 
internal use, which could help the ruling party to show electorate 
about persistent work of the ruling elite on restoration of the ter-
ritorial integrity of Georgia, and to gain a greater support from the 
population and thus to retain power. On 23 November, 2011 Presi-
dent Saakashvili, in his best PR making traditions and live TV show, 
awarded “the Order of Glory” Chief Advisor to the Prime Minster 
Ms. Tamar Kovziridze and Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Sergi Kap-
anadze for “professionalism and fruitful diplomacy during long and 
exhausting negotiations on Russia’s accession to the WTO”. The 
President called these achievements as “historic,” gaining “one of 
the greatest” diplomatic victories for two decades of Georgia’s in-
dependence; and “for the first time international monitoring of the 
movement of goods will begin within the internationally recognized 
borders of Georgia.” (Tabula.ge, 2012), (Gurgenidze, 2011).
The Kremlin scored victory as well and was celebrating the 
serious gains: firstly, Russia at last received a WTO membership 
ticket, secondly, the Agreement did not change the status quo in 
the region, and thirdly no serious concessions were made to Tbili-
si over the status of the secessionist regions and finally, the two 
customs checkpoints have actually been legalized. After victorious 
statements made in Tbilisi the Russian Foreign Ministry disclosed 
the essence of the Agreement and decided “to inform the inter-
national community” about the actual content of the documents 
signed in Geneva (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Feder-
ation, 2011). According to the Russian Foreign Ministry:
• The Agreement applies to three trade corridors: three Russian 
and three Georgian customs terminals/points which are located in 
specific areas. Particularly, in case of Russia: Adler (near the bor-
der with Abkhazia), the village of Lower Zaramag (near the border 
with South Ossetia) and the village of Upper Lars (at the Kazbegi 
district, Georgia). The Georgian customs terminals were sited on 
the left bank of the Inguri River (Georgian administrative border 
with Abkhazia), in the area north of Gori (bordering with South Os-
setia) and in district of Kazbegi (Russian border).
• This is not only the mutual trade between Russia and Georgia, 
but also goods exchanges between each of these two countries 
and Abkhazia and South Ossetia (for example, goods from Sokhu-
mi on their way to Russia, or goods from Tskhinvali region heading 
to Tbilisi through the Gori area).
• The task of verifying the accuracy of summary statistics for-
warded by Russia and Georgia to the WTO will be entrusted to an 
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independent private company.  
• The trade information that the company obtains within the 
framework of the work under contract with each of the two govern-
ments are to be treated as strictly confidential and are not intended 
for transfer to the other Party to the Agreement. 
• The measures of customs administration and monitoring pro-
vided by the Agreement apply only to both Russia and Georgia. 
This has important political implications. Thus, according to the 
Agreement, customs terminals are set up in the trade corridors 
leading from Georgia to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with customs 
procedures applicable to commercial goods passing through them. 
Clearly, all these are important attributes of the status of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as autonomous customs areas and of the status 
of Georgia’s border with them as a customs boundary. 
If we compare the two available different views over the signed 
agreement we will conclude that the truth should lie somewhere 
in the middle. However the trickiest issue for Georgia was the so 
called “three trade corridors”, particularly the two ones passing Ab-
khazia and South Ossetia, which represent for Georgia the weakest 
point. By the way, from the outset it became clear that establish-
ment of monitoring on the Kazbegi-Upper Lars undisputed section 
of the state border was absolutely useless exercise, because both 
Russia and Georgia at this section have well developed infrastruc-
ture for border control with relevant customs facilities. As to other 
two corridors, for Georgia proper, customs terminals are set at the 
administrative border of Georgia on the left bank of the Inguri River 
and North of Gori district or at the administrative borders of Georgia 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia will report its trade with 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia proper separately as inter-
national trade and forward trade turnover statistics to the WTO’s 
Integrated Data Base on a monthly basis (Civil.ge, 2011). 
In case of Georgia (here we exclude Kazbegi-Upper Lars di-
rection), the trade corridor means streams of goods passing the 
occupied territories with both directions. However, there is no signif-
icant inflow and outflow of products and services between Georgia 
proper, on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the 
other, and there was no necessity for fixing “customs terminals” at 
the Georgian administrative borders. On top of that Georgia under-
took the commitment to pay to international monitors for their ser-
vices on the territory controlled by the central authorities and by all 
means it was routine duties of customs services to check inflow and 
outflow of commercial cargos. Since early days of commencement 
of the bilateral negotiations (September 2000), Georgia’s primary 
goal was to seek for control on the two checkpoints – Gantiadi-Ad-
ler and Roki-Lower Zaramag at the outer Georgian borders (as it 
is described above). As a result of the signed accords, apart from 
these two border crossing points Georgia received an internation-
al control on its inner administrative borders which actually gave 
a pretext to the Kremlin to claim victory over “recognition of two 
Georgian provinces as independent customs territories” (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2011). 
Notwithstanding that, the agreement does not envisage control 
on marine shipments of commercial cargoes in case of Abkhazia. 
It is well known that both Russia and Turkey trade with Abkhazia 
by merchant fleet and shipments to the port Sokhumi and Geor-
gian maritime borders at the Abkhazian section are controlled by 
Russian border guards. Russia can use this route for any shipment 
bypassing the installed international monitoring system.   
Furthermore, the agreement refers to flow of only trade/com-
mercial goods, which means that military supplies are not applica-
ble for international monitors. The putting into operation of the Rus-
sian checkpoints at the Abkhazian and South Ossetian sections of 
the Georgian state border in early 90s was explained by necessity 
of military deliveries destined for Russian military units stationed in 
the mentioned Georgian provinces. For the Georgian central au-
thorities it was always a real threat and a great puzzle over Russian 
military inland shipments coming into Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Actually the 9 November 2011 Agreement gave a free hand to Rus-
sia to supply the military bases and secessionist regimes with any 
type of military equipment they want to deploy on the ground with 
no control from the international monitoring system. In our point 
of view, everything above-mentioned causes misgivings about ne-
cessity and usefulness of the Agreement and the above-mentioned 
arrangement can be assessed as a serious weakness of the Saak-
shvili diplomacy.
The implementation of the agreement became yet another 
sticking point for the trade monitoring issue: quite a few technical 
problems arose from early days when the Swiss inspection compa-
ny SGS (Société Générale de Surveillance) was selected in 2012 to mon-
itor the movement of goods on the mention three trade corridors. As 
it was envisaged by the agreement, the separate Georgia-SGS and 
Russia-SGS contracts have to be concluded, parties should set up 
a steering Joint Committee composed of representatives of each 
party and arrange deployment of SGS personnel at the entry/exit 
locations of the corridors within the established grid points (Civil.ge, 
2015). For Russia it was quite easy to arrange monitoring at its al-
ready established and operating border and customs checkpoints. 
In case of Georgia it became an Achilles’ heel to set up customs 
terminals at the administrative border with breakaway regains with 
no relevant infrastructure and under permanent pressure and pro- 
vocations from the Russian border guards expanding administra-
tive borders and installing barbed wire fences along the occupation 
line (Civil.ge, 2015). 
As a result, the implementation of the agreement was delayed 
several times. In June 2014 the draft contract with SGS submitted 
by the Georgian government had become already outdated: during 
his visit to Georgia Swiss President and Foreign Minister Mr. Didi-
er Burkhalter admitted that “we are still discussing this document; 
it should be noted that it is quite a problematic issue, may be ... 
some changes have to be introduced into the contract with SGS” 
(Kirtzkhalia, 2014). The Georgian government tasked the Ministry 
of Finance to oversee the implementation of the project. Overall sit-
uation was on standstill and the first term (a three-year term) of the 
Agreement expired in August 2015 with no progress and renewed 
for the next three-year term. 
As we can see, no significant practical gains received Georgia 
since entering into force of the Agreement (the date of the acces-
sion of Russia to the WTO – 22 August 2012). For the “Georgian 
Dream Coalition” led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who won the 
parliamentary election in October 2012, implementation of the 9 
November Agreement (2011) concluded by the Saakshvili regime 
was not politically beneficial and they did not show any signs of 
enthusiasm in accelerating of the enforcement process. It became 
clear that Russia too did not rush for commencement of interna-
tional monitoring because it was not in Moscow’s interests setting 
up any type of inspection of cargo flows with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. As it seems to us, prospects for international monitoring of 
trade between Georgia and Russia for the foreseeable future are 
quite vague.
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Conclusion
Since September 2000, when Georgia formally joined Russia’s 
WTO accession deliberations, both Russia and Georgia travelled a 
long and uneasy road: start-stop trade negotiations became a vic-
tim to political disputes existing between the two countries, which 
had lasted for 11 years. Both Tbilisi and Moscow were primarily led 
by political and security considerations and negotiating teams in 
Geneva translated national foreign policy priorities into the WTO 
language. Nevertheless, Georgia did not need to reinvent a wheel: 
Russia was already violating basic principles of international trade 
and was giving a good reason to the Georgian delegation to raise 
some critical issues at the WTO accession talks, certainly to Rus-
sia’s great displeasure. Furthermore, for Georgia these diplomatic 
negotiations served the purpose of foreign policy objectives: if the 
Georgian government succeeded in the talks, it would be used as 
bargaining chips in future Georgia-Russia negotiations on a broad-
er bilateral agenda. Initially Moscow was simply ignoring the Geor-
gian concerns and was rejecting the legitimacy of questions posed 
by the Georgian delegation at the WTO accession talks; at a later 
stage it was just reluctant to be engaged in the process of consid-
eration of those significant points, finally, during last negotiations 
round the Russian Federation has demonstrated a some signs of 
goodwill for finding out the ways of mutually agreeable solution of 
those problems.
Georgia, as a small and vulnerable country, had a little leverage 
in market access negotiations – possibilities for significant gains 
were very small. Relations between Tbilisi and Moscow were ad-
ditionally burdened with quite confronting and sometimes hostile 
environment: the Russian-Georgian relations since Georgia’s inde-
pendence were very tense and complex, overshadowed by Rus-
sia’s support of aggressive separatism which resulted in a loss of 
control over Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Regular pressure exerted on Georgia, manipulation with supply of 
energy resources, trade restrictions and import bans, interference 
in the domestic political affairs and lastly Russia’s resurgent im-
perial ambitions for keeping Georgia within sphere of its influence 
represented a real threat to the national interests of Georgia. De-
spite all odds, in these circumstances, Russia’s WTO accession 
talks were a promising playground for Georgia: if Tbilisi together 
with other partner countries could manage to disclose Russia’s 
WTO inconsistencies, violation of undertaken international com-
mitments, introduction of discriminative and unjustified measures 
against trade partners, Russia would be transformed into a more 
accountable to international norms and a reliable partner. 
Moscow at the Geneva talks had a simple plan: as a prima-
ry task, the Kremlin wanted to complete bilateral negotiations with 
the main trade actors, finalize multilateral talks and then jointly with 
other WP members to raise pressure on tiny Georgia for getting 
a WTO membership ticket. On the other hand, Russia wanted to 
remove the “Georgian awkward factor” from the WP deliberations: 
the Georgian statements, uncomfortable questions and exerting 
permanent pressure over the whole range of trade related issues 
often baffled the Russian delegation. 
In 2003 Russian tactics over negotiations with Georgia was 
changed towards seeking new ways of solving problems and actu-
ally this shift was considered as a positive sign. The border check-
points and visa issues were of particular concern and quite sensi-
tive for the Georgian government: if earlier Russia tried to convince 
WTO member countries that Georgian problems were outside of 
the WTO scope, in 2003 Russia implied that one of the ways to 
solve problems would be a commitment undertaken by Russia to 
legalize illegal customs checkpoints as well as abolish the discrim-
inative visa regime upon accession. 
After the November 2003 Rose Revolution and peaceful trans-
fer of power in Georgia bilateral relations received a new impetus 
and positive dynamics. In March 2004 Putin-Saakashvili summit 
held in Moscow gave very promising outcomes. In May Georgia 
and Russia signed a bilateral market access agreement: Russia 
granted Georgia requested INRs; besides the separate protocol 
was signed where Russia pledged to eliminate all inconsistencies 
in the field of customs regulation and administration, and to bring 
its trade policies and practices into conformity with WTO principles 
and norms. Moscow was very pleased with the fresh start from the 
“clean slate” and played significant role in peaceful departure from 
power of Adjarian secessionist warlord Aslan Abashidze. 
The August 2004 brief war at the Tskhinvali district was a 
turning point in Russian policy towards Georgia. The sequence 
of events showed that the Georgia-Russia honeymoon was over 
and the countries were dragged into the “cold war” stage. Accord-
ing to the Kremlin’s calculations security of Russia’s South flank 
was entirely dependent on the situation in South Caucasus and 
particularly Georgia. Actually for Moscow low politics became a 
supplement for high politics. 
In 2004-2006 political environment for the Russian-Georgian 
WTO talks became even more adverse. For Georgia it was not 
easy to stand firm to Moscow’s sabre-rattling; in the following years 
the Kremlin was able to exert considerable pressure over Georgia 
on all directions. Gas delivery manipulation, regular violation of the 
Georgian airspace, provocative actions of the Russian peacekeep-
ers became a daily routine for the Georgian-Russian relations. In 
February 2006 Russia stopped issuing visas for Georgian nation-
als, in March banned import of Georgian wine and wine products 
and then distilled alcoholic beverages.
The general deterioration in Russian-Georgian political relations 
started in spring 2008. In early August 2008 endless provocations 
from both sides around Tskhinvali district culminated in a Russian 
military intervention and a full-scale war between the two countries 
which ended with catastrophic consequences for Georgia: Russia 
occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia, recognized independence 
of the two Georgian provinces, signed strategic partnership and 
free trade agreements with de facto regimes, built-up two military 
bases and conducted the “borderzation” of administrative borders 
between Georgia proper and the mentioned secessionist regions. 
Subsequently, the war had quite a negative impact on the Russia’s 
accession to the TWO and particularly on Russian-Georgian talks: 
it had been frozen for two more years. 
By the end of 2010 Georgia became an “inhibiting factor” on the 
final way of Russia’s WTO membership. The Government of Geor-
gia acknowledged that the Russia’s accession to the WTO was a 
matter of significance for US and EU. In January 2011 Tbilisi put 
forward a new approach over resumption of bilateral negotiations. 
This diplomatic gesture was a result of delicate reminder coming 
from Western capitals that some win-win solution should be elab-
orated. After a few rounds of negotiations held in Switzerland the 
parties decided to focus on international monitoring of the contest-
ed borders. 
On 9 November 2011, in Geneva, under mediation of the Swiss 
diplomats, Georgia and Russia signed a package of documents: 
a bilateral agreement on the basic principles for a mechanism of 
customs administration and monitoring of trade in goods, relevant 
Memorandum of Understanding affirming the role of Switzerland as 
a mediator, as well as documents to define conditions and tasks for 
operation of a neutral private company. 
Tbilisi and Moscow both claimed victory. This agreement was 
considered by the Georgian government as an important diplo-
matic achievement which enables Georgia through independent 
international observance to monitor trade between Russia and the 
Georgian breakaway regions, which was followed by the noisy PR 
campaign orchestrated by Saakashvili.  The Kremlin scored vic-
tory as well and was celebrating the serious gains: firstly, at last 
Russia has got the green light for WTO membership, secondly, the 
Agreement did not change the status quo in the region, thirdly no 
serious concessions were made to Tbilisi over the status of the 
secessionist regions and, lastly, all Russian border crossings with 
Georgia were legitimized.
If we compare the two available different views over the signed 
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agreement we can conclude that this is a type of win-win outcome 
or the truth should lie somewhere in the middle. However the trick-
iest issue for Georgia was the so called “three trade corridors”, 
which meant streams of goods passing with both directions, partic-
ularly the two ones, passing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, undoubt-
edly representing for Georgia the weakest point.
From the outset it became clear that establishment of moni-
toring on the Kazbegi-Upper Lars undisputed section of the state 
border was a useless exercise, because both Russia and Georgia 
have well developed infrastructure for border control with relevant 
customs facilities and never complained about lack of control and 
trade information at this frontier section. As to other two corridors, 
inspection facilities are to be set in Zugdidi and Gori regions and 
there was no necessity for fixing “customs terminals” at the Geor-
gian administrative borders with absence of inflow and outflow of 
goods and services between Georgia proper, on the one hand, and 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the other. On top of that Georgia 
undertook the commitment to pay to international monitors for their 
services on the Georgian territory. 
Since early days of commencement of the bilateral negotia-
tions, Georgia’s primary goal was to seek for control on the two 
border checkpoints – Gantiadi-Adler and Roki-Lower Zaramag – 
at the outer Georgian borders. However, as it is stipulated in the 
Agreement, apart from these two border crossing points Georgia 
received an international control on its inner administrative borders 
which actually gave a pretext to the Kremlin to claim victory over 
“recognition of two Georgian provinces as independent customs 
territories”. Notwithstanding that, the agreement does not envisage 
control on marine shipments in case of Abkhazia and refers to flow 
of only commercial goods, which means that military supplies are 
not applicable for international monitors. 
A victorious mood of the Georgian leadership over “great diplo-
matic achievements” had certainly been exaggerated. Conclusion 
of the agreement for Saakashvili had more face-saving outcome 
than breaking negotiations deadlock and the Georgian interests 
serving effect. Undoubtedly, some monitoring system over Russian 
checkpoints at the Abkhazian and South Ossetian sections of the 
Georgian state border can be established, but this is a very shaky 
arrangement and Russia will always try to avoid any monitoring of 
trade with occupied territories; especially, the existing “black holes” 
outside these corridors provide a good opportunity for avoidance of 
the international customs control. In our point of view, everything 
the above-mentioned causes misgivings about necessity of the 
Agreement and the overall outcome of the negotiations can be as-
sessed as a weakness of the Saakashvili diplomacy.
The implementation of the agreement became yet another 
sticking point for the trade monitoring issue: quite a few technical 
problems arose from early days when the Swiss inspection com-
pany SGS was selected to monitor the movement of goods in the 
mentioned three trade corridors. For Russia it was quite easy to 
arrange monitoring at its already established and operating border 
crossings. In case of Georgia it became quite awkward to set up 
customs terminals at the administrative borders with breakaway 
regions with no relevant infrastructure and under permanent pres-
sure and provocations from the Russian border guards expanding 
administrative borders and installing barbed wire fences along the 
occupation line. As a result, the implementation of the agreement 
was delayed several times. Overall situation was on standstill and 
the first term (a three-year term) of the Agreement expired in 
August 2015 with no significant progress in that direction. 
To sum up we can conclude that no significant practical gains 
Georgia has received since entering into force of the Agreement 
(22 August 2012). For Georgia outcome of long negotiations is 
quite vague, implementation of the Agreement is politically very 
sensitive and technically complex. In this connection a legitimate 
question has arisen: was the game worth the candle? For the 
“Georgian Dream Coalition” led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, who won 
the parliamentary election in October 2012, implementation of the 
Agreement concluded by the Saakshvili regime was not politically 
beneficial (as many other Saakashvili’s “feats”) and they did not 
show any signs of enthusiasm in catalyzing of the enforcement pro-
cess. Furthermore, all information about “progress” of implemen-
tation of the Agreement and SGS activities both in Georgia and 
in Russia is kept under the veil of secrecy, giving food for thought 
for further speculations. It became clear that Russia did not rush 
either for commencement of the international monitoring because 
it was not in Moscow’s interests setting up any type of inspection 
of cargo flows with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We can assume 
that prospects for efficient international monitoring of trade between 
Georgia and Russia across the secessionist regions are quite bleak 
for the foreseeable future and much of the Agreement may turn out 
to be redundant.  
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